Moral Realism: Investigating the View That Moral Truths Exist Independently of Human Opinions or Beliefs.

Moral Realism: Investigating the View That Moral Truths Exist Independently of Human Opinions or Beliefs

(Lecture Hall Ambience: Crickets chirping, a single spotlight illuminates the podium. A lone, slightly eccentric Professor with a tweed jacket and mismatched socks steps up, adjusts their glasses, and clears their throat.)

Professor Quirke: Good evening, or rather, good being (said with a wink and a dramatic pause). Tonight, we delve into a philosophical landscape fraught with peril, teeming with intellectual bandits, and littered with the bleached bones of failed arguments. We’re going to talk about… Moral Realism! 😱

(Professor Quirke dramatically throws confetti in the air. A single piece lands on their nose.)

Yes, Moral Realism. The brave, some might say foolhardy, belief that morality isn’t just a matter of taste, like preferring pineapple on pizza (a crime against humanity, in my humble opinion 🍕🚫), but something… real. Something that exists independently of what you, I, or even the entire population of Twitter thinks.

(Professor Quirke pulls out a chalkboard, already adorned with a cartoonish drawing of a moral compass pointing stubbornly in one direction.)

I. Setting the Stage: What IS Moral Realism?

(Professor Quirke taps the chalkboard with a piece of chalk. A cloud of dust erupts.)

Okay, let’s define our terms, shall we? Imagine a world where morality is entirely subjective. Your "good" is my "evil," and there’s no objective way to adjudicate. That’s Moral Subjectivism, or Moral Relativism – the antithesis of what we’re exploring tonight.

Moral Realism, on the other hand, claims that moral statements are capable of being true or false, and that at least some of them are true, and that these truths hold independently of our beliefs, opinions, or feelings about them.

Think of it like this:

Position Core Claim Analogy Example
Moral Subjectivism Moral truths are determined by individual beliefs/opinions. "Ice cream flavor: I like chocolate, you like vanilla. Neither is ‘better’." "Torture is wrong to me."
Moral Relativism Moral truths are determined by cultural norms. "Different cultures have different customs. Neither is inherently ‘better’." "What’s considered ‘moral’ in one culture might be immoral in another."
Moral Realism Moral truths exist objectively, independently of beliefs/opinions/cultures. "2 + 2 = 4. This is true regardless of whether anyone believes it." "Torture is objectively wrong, regardless of whether anyone believes it’s okay."

(Professor Quirke points at the table with a dramatic flourish.)

See the difference? Realists believe there’s a moral fact of the matter, like the fact that the Earth orbits the Sun (sorry, flat-earthers! 🌍). They believe moral statements can be judged as true or false in the same way we judge scientific or mathematical statements.

Think of it this way: Is there an objective answer to the question, "Does gravity exist?" Most of us would say yes! Moral Realists believe the same holds true for moral questions. Is there an objective answer to the question, "Is it wrong to torture innocent children?" Moral Realists believe yes, and that the answer is a resounding "HELL NO!" 😠

II. Varieties of Moral Realism: A Buffet of Ethical Options

(Professor Quirke pulls out a menu with the title "Moral Realism à la Carte." )

Now, Moral Realism isn’t a monolithic block. It comes in different flavors, each with its own unique ingredients and preparation method. Let’s sample some of the most popular dishes:

  • Moral Naturalism: This view holds that moral properties are natural properties. They are part of the natural world, just like height, weight, or chemical composition. We can discover them through observation and empirical investigation, just like scientists discover the laws of physics.

    • Example: A naturalist might argue that "good" is equivalent to "promoting human flourishing." We can then study what promotes human flourishing through empirical methods.
  • Moral Non-Naturalism (Intuitionism): This view claims that moral properties are real, but they are not reducible to natural properties. They are sui generis – unique and distinct. We grasp them through intuition or a special faculty of moral perception.

    • Example: An intuitionist might argue that we simply know that torturing innocent children is wrong, through a direct moral intuition. It’s self-evident.
  • Moral Rationalism: This view argues that moral truths are discoverable through reason and logic. Just like we can use reason to understand mathematical truths, we can use reason to understand moral truths.

    • Example: A rationalist might argue that the Golden Rule ("Do unto others as you would have them do unto you") is a fundamental moral principle that can be derived from reason.
  • Moral Platonism: This view holds that moral truths are abstract objects existing in a realm independent of the physical world, similar to Plato’s Forms. They are eternal, unchanging, and accessible through reason.

    • Example: A Platonist might argue that "justice" exists as a perfect Form, and our earthly conceptions of justice are mere imperfect reflections of that ideal.

(Professor Quirke coughs and takes a sip of water from a comically large glass.)

So, you see, even within Moral Realism, there’s room for disagreement. It’s a diverse and vibrant ecosystem! Just like with pizza… you can argue about toppings all day, but at least you agree it’s pizza! 🍕🍕🍕

III. Arguments FOR Moral Realism: Rallying the Troops for Truth!

(Professor Quirke picks up a toy trumpet and plays a short, off-key fanfare.)

Now, why would anyone believe in Moral Realism? What arguments support this seemingly outlandish claim? Let’s examine some of the most compelling reasons:

  • The Argument from Moral Disagreement: This argument claims that the existence of genuine moral disagreement implies that there must be objective moral truths. If morality were purely subjective, then disagreements would just be matters of personal taste, like preferring chocolate to vanilla. But we often argue vehemently about moral issues, implying that we believe there’s a right and wrong answer.

    • Example: Debates about abortion, capital punishment, or animal rights are often heated and passionate, suggesting that we believe there’s more at stake than just personal preference.
  • The Argument from Moral Progress: This argument points to the fact that societies often make moral progress. We abolish slavery, grant women the right to vote, and recognize the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals. This progress implies that there’s a standard of moral improvement that we’re moving towards. But if morality were purely subjective or relative, then there would be no such thing as moral progress – only change.

    • Example: The abolition of slavery is widely considered a moral advance. But if morality were purely relative, then there would be no basis for claiming that it’s better to abolish slavery than to perpetuate it.
  • The Argument from Moral Explanation: This argument claims that moral facts can explain certain phenomena in the world. For example, the wrongness of slavery can explain why people fought against it and why it caused so much suffering. If moral facts were not real, then it would be difficult to explain these phenomena.

    • Example: The fact that the Holocaust was morally wrong can explain why people resisted the Nazis and why the Holocaust is considered a historical tragedy.
  • The Argument from Moral Error: This argument argues that we sometimes make moral mistakes. We can believe that something is right when it is actually wrong. But if morality were purely subjective, then we could never be mistaken about our own moral beliefs.

    • Example: People who supported slavery may have sincerely believed that it was morally permissible. But we now recognize that they were mistaken.
  • The Linguistic Argument: This argument states that our language implies the existence of moral facts. We use words like "right," "wrong," "good," and "bad" as if they refer to something real. We make moral judgments as if they are true or false. If morality were purely subjective, then our language would be misleading.

(Professor Quirke beams proudly.)

These are just a few of the arguments that have been put forward in support of Moral Realism. They’re not foolproof, of course. But they offer compelling reasons to believe that morality is more than just a matter of opinion.

IV. Challenges to Moral Realism: The Enemy at the Gates!

(Professor Quirke dons a helmet made of tin foil and clutches a rubber chicken.)

Of course, Moral Realism faces formidable challenges. Critics argue that it’s implausible, unnecessary, and even dangerous. Let’s examine some of the most common objections:

  • The Argument from Queerness: This argument, famously articulated by J.L. Mackie, claims that if moral properties existed, they would be "utterly different from anything else in the universe." They would be objectively prescriptive – they would somehow compel us to act in certain ways just by virtue of their existence. But this is a very strange and mysterious idea. How could a moral property have such a power?

    • Analogy: Imagine a color that could force you to feel happy just by looking at it. That would be a very strange and queer property indeed!
  • The Argument from Motivation: This argument claims that moral beliefs are inherently motivating. If you believe that something is wrong, you’ll be motivated to avoid doing it. But if moral properties were real and independent of our beliefs, then they wouldn’t necessarily motivate us. Why should we care about some abstract moral fact?

    • Example: If you believe that torturing innocent children is wrong, you’ll be motivated to prevent it. But if the wrongness of torture were just a brute fact about the universe, why should that motivate you?
  • The Argument from Epistemic Access: This argument claims that if moral properties existed, we would need some way of knowing about them. But how could we possibly know about objective moral truths? Through intuition? Through reason? Through empirical observation? None of these methods seems adequate.

    • Analogy: Imagine trying to discover the laws of physics using only your feelings. It would be impossible! Similarly, it may be impossible to discover objective moral truths using only our moral intuitions.
  • The Argument from Cultural Relativism: This argument points to the wide variation in moral beliefs across different cultures. What’s considered morally acceptable in one culture may be considered morally reprehensible in another. This suggests that morality is relative to culture, not objective.

    • Example: Attitudes towards polygamy, arranged marriage, and eating certain animals vary widely across different cultures.
  • The Argument from Evolutionary Biology: This argument claims that our moral beliefs are the product of evolution. They evolved because they helped our ancestors survive and reproduce. This suggests that morality is a biological adaptation, not an objective truth.

    • Example: Our sense of fairness may have evolved because it helped our ancestors cooperate with each other.

(Professor Quirke dramatically removes the tin foil helmet and sighs.)

These are powerful objections, and Moral Realists have to take them seriously. They need to provide plausible answers to these questions if they want to maintain their belief in objective morality.

V. Moral Realism Today: Still Kicking (and Arguing)!

(Professor Quirke pulls out a modern-looking tablet and taps on the screen.)

Despite these challenges, Moral Realism remains a vibrant and influential position in contemporary ethics. Many philosophers continue to defend it, developing new and sophisticated arguments in its favor. They are grappling with the objections raised by critics and refining their own views.

Here are some of the ongoing debates in Moral Realism:

  • The Metaethical Status of Moral Properties: Are moral properties natural properties, non-natural properties, or something else entirely?

  • The Epistemology of Moral Knowledge: How can we know about objective moral truths?

  • The Relationship between Morality and Motivation: How can we explain the fact that moral beliefs are inherently motivating?

  • The Implications of Evolutionary Biology for Morality: How can we reconcile our understanding of morality as a biological adaptation with the belief that it is also objective?

(Professor Quirke scrolls through the tablet, looking increasingly animated.)

Moral Realism is not just an academic exercise. It has important implications for how we live our lives. If morality is objective, then we have a responsibility to try to discover what’s right and wrong and to act accordingly. We can’t just shrug our shoulders and say that morality is a matter of personal opinion.

It also has implications for how we treat each other. If morality is objective, then we have a basis for criticizing the moral beliefs and practices of other cultures and individuals. We can’t just say that everyone is entitled to their own moral views.

VI. Conclusion: The Journey Continues…

(Professor Quirke puts the tablet down and looks out at the (imaginary) audience.)

So, there you have it: a whirlwind tour of Moral Realism. We’ve explored its core claims, examined its different varieties, considered the arguments for and against it, and discussed its contemporary relevance.

Is Moral Realism true? I can’t tell you for sure. That’s a question that you have to answer for yourself. But I hope that this lecture has given you some food for thought and that you’ll continue to explore this fascinating and important topic.

(Professor Quirke bows deeply, accidentally knocking over the chalkboard. Dust fills the air.)

And remember, even if you disagree with Moral Realism, it’s important to understand it. Because even if morality isn’t objectively real, the belief that it is can have a powerful influence on our lives.

(Professor Quirke picks up the rubber chicken and waves it goodbye. The spotlight fades.)

(Sound of crickets chirping intensifies. The lecture hall is empty.)

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